Examining the Boston Celtics’ clutch-time statistics in detail this year

Examining the Boston Celtics’ clutch-time statistics in detail this year

 

Their clutch offense has been the one area of concern for the majority of Boston Celtics supporters and basketball media figures this season. especially the way they close the game offensively.

For a brief moment, picture the fourth quarter of a tie game. Boston holds the ball with just under a minute left on the clock. What sort of play are you expecting to see? As demonstrated at the conclusion of regulation in the most recent Atlanta game with a tied score, the most common solution is an isolation by Jayson Tatum or Jaylen Brown.

The gameplan was to just get Tatum the ball and see what happens, thus not much of an action was taken.

For the past few years, the Celtics have been dogged by this criticism. Many have questioned why, in close games, their offensive tends to slow down and they begin to play the clock rather than the opposition. They switch back to a hero ball format that features their two All-NBA wings and don’t run much off-ball action. How do the statistics, though?

Is it the worst thing they could be doing, and is that all they are doing during this time of crisis?

The Celtics have proven to be a capable clutch club as a unit. Despite this, their domination during the regular season is the sole reason they are ranked No. 21 in clutch frequency. With only a few weeks till the playoffs begin, there is cause for concern when examining their post-All-Star performances. With a 16.9 net rating, Boston is sixth overall with an offensive clutch rating of 122 and eighth with their defensive rating of 105.2.

 

But after the All-Star break, those rankings fall to 121.3/(22nd) and 112 (15th), with a net rating of -9.3. It’s a valid issue when you take into account the criticisms about their late-game offense from previous seasons.

However, the Celtics did make a different call at the conclusion of overtime in that same game versus Atlanta. They had Tatum cut to the basket and ran everything via Kristaps Porzingis. Brown was able to gain enough space as a result to receive the ball and make a difficult elbow shot.

There was the desired off-ball movement, even though it was still not an open shot. Although Brown’s shot didn’t result in a wide-open look, he has been making those kinds of shots all year. His 2-point field goals with a defender within 2-4 feet account for the majority of his shot diet (37.1%), which he makes at a rate of 60.4%. Although that wasn’t a free shot.

Tatum’s disputed pull-up three-pointer at the end of regulation, however, was not as successful as his shot. This season, Tatum is hitting 35.2 percent on pull-up threes and just 34% on threes when a defender is between two and four feet away from him. Although Tatum wasn’t required to make an off-balance pull-up three in this instance, that is the main point of contention. The idea of the play was to get Tatum the ball and give him control of the game. Getting the ball to your star is not unusual in NBA history, but instead of calling a play to give him a greater chance to score, why not?